Kas kaladel ja kaheksajalgadel on teadvus?
see on väga tähtis küsimus! ilma naljata – kindlalt teame me ju vaid iseenda teadvuse kohta. kõik teised võivad olla filosoofilised zombid (teadvuseta olendid, kes käituvad nagu teadvusel olijad). Ehk on isegi blogi kirjutajad zombid, kes lihtsalt iroonilisel kombel kirjutavad teadvusest ja kõva häälega väidavad end teadvusel olevat! Olgu, liigikaaslaste puhul võib ju siiski oletada, et nad on teadvusel. aga kassid-koerad? ajud on inimese omaga mingil määral sarnased … no, ehk on ka. Aga kalad? Kaheksajalad? Naljakal kombel leidub selleaastasel teadvuseteadvuse konverentsil ettekandeid, mis seda küsimust vastata üritavad.
Ilya Farber peab kaladest naljaka nimega ettekande “The Neuroanatomical Case Against Consciousness in Fish: Hard Evidence and Theoretical Speculations“, mille sisukokkuvõte on järgnev:
Can fish suffer? That is, can they consciously experience pain – or for that matter, any other sensation? In this paper, I argue that the neuroanatomical evidence is surprisingly unequivocal: fish brains lack anything like the right kind of structure for supporting the dynamic, multisensory feature binding that is essential for consciousness. In mammals, the diffusely-projecting structures of the intrathalamic nuclei and thalamic reticular nucleus are necessary for sensory awareness, and a lesion of either results in a permanent loss of consciousness. In fish these structures are absent, and importantly, no other structure is situated to perform the relevant functions. If we take the leading neural models of consciousness seriously, this alone should be sufficient to disqualify fish as bearers of consciousness – though there is also strong converging evidence from ablation studies and from comparative anatomy. My aim here is not to pursue any particular grudge against ichthyans, nor to make excuses for eating them (I don’t). Rather, in previous work I have argued that taking ourselves seriously as theorists of consciousness must mean taking our theories seriously even – or especially – when they have consequences which are morally troubling. In my experience, many people (including neuroscientists) are particularly uncomfortable with the idea of using neural theories of consciousness to make claims about its absence. In this paper, then, my goal is to lay out the evidence and then focus on the questions surrounding this sort of judgment: Is it anthropocentric? Is it putting too much confidence in our theories? Are there alternative standards which are more suitable for making judgments about the moral status of nonhuman animals? I will argue that, in each case, the answer is no.
Aga kaheksajalad? sellest räägib David Eadelman, kes on nähtavasti kaheksajalgadega läbi viinud muidu inimeste peal kasutatava tähelepanu silmapilgutuse katse: “Probing the Phyletic Boundaries of Consciousness: Cephalopod Psychophysics“. Sisukokkuvõte:
Psychophysical experiments generally rely on the ability of conscious individuals to give accurate verbal reports of what they are experiencing, and therefore usually involve human subjects. In most non-human animals, percepts or sensations cannot be assessed directly through verbal report, and psychophysical experiments are therefore quite difficult to perform. Nevertheless, it is possible to exploit non-verbal, behavioral channels to investigate phenomenal experience in non-human animals. Here, we present a psychophysical experimental approach for assessing perceptual capacities of the cephalopod mollusc Octopus vulgaris that may be consistent with conscious states. In our experiments, sequences of visual data were shown to free behaving octopuses via a submersible organic light-emitting diode (OLED) video display. We presented rapid serial sequences of stimuli via the OLED display at rates impossible to achieve through manual presentation to explore the temporal properties of visual perception and sensory integration in O. vulgaris. We employed the ‘attentional blink’ paradigm, in which a target secondary visual stimulus is presented 200–500ms after a primary stimulus within a rapid serial stream of stimuli. When shown such a visual stream, human subjects remain unaware of the secondary ‘blink’ stimulus as long as the interval between presentation of the first and second stimulus does not exceed 500ms. If the interval exceeds 500ms, the human subject becomes aware of the blink stimulus. In these experiments, serial stimuli presented in video sequences were chosen for their particular salience for the octopuses. These stimuli included both images of objects with ecological salience i.e., crabs or other octopuses and images of objects immediately relevant to the octopuses’ everyday laboratory experiences i.e., white plastic balls associated with positive experiences (fish) or red plastic balls associated with negative experiences (mild electrical shock). Changes in components of octopus body patterning (i.e., chromatic, textural, postural, locomotor) were considered to be forms of behavioral report. The absence of any change during presentation of a ‘blink’ stimulus known to otherwise induce specific patterning shifts indicated that a subject was unaware of that stimulus. We discuss our results and the possibility of functionally convergent properties of cephalopod and vertebrate perception.
Viimaks ometi on lootust, et olulised küsimused saavad vastatud!