Elu “saladus” ja teadvuse “mõistatus” – kui sarnane on nende olemus ja saatus?
Mis on teadvus? Kas ja kuidas on seda mõistlik uurida? Seda oleme nüüd üsna pikalt ja üsna konstruktiivselt arutanud eelmise postituse kommentaariumis alates KT vastavast küsimusest. Kuna me jõudsime ka elu ja teadvuse probleemi võrdluseni, siis ma kopeeriksin siia nii elu kui ka teadvuse probleemiga tegelenud Francis Cricki sõnad teadvuse probleemi ja teadvuse ning elu saladuste võrdluse kohta:
“What is it that puzzles philosophers? Broadly speaking, it is qualia –the blueness of blue, the painfulness of pain, and so on. This is also the layman’s major puzzle. How can you possibly explain the vivid visual scene you see before you in terms of the firing of neurons? The argument that you cannot explain consciousness by the action of the parts of the brain goes back at least as far as Leibniz (1686; see the translation 1965). But compare an analogous assertion: that you cannot explain the “livingness” of living things (such as bacteria, for example) by the action of “dead” molecules. This assertion sounds extremely hollow now, for an umber of reasons. Scientists understand the enormous power of Natural Selection. They know the chemical nature of genes and that inheritance is particulate, not blending. They understand the great subtlety, sophistication and variety of protein molecules, the elaborate nature of the control mechanisms that turn genes on and off, and the complicated way that proteins interact with, and modify, other proteins. It is entirely possible that the very elaborate nature of neurons and their interactions, far more elaborate than most people imagine, is misleading us, in a similar way, about consciousness.” (Crick & Koch, 1998)
autorid jätkavad, tuues esile ka selle, et analoogia on pelgalt analoogia ja et aju puhul oleme me oma baasteadmistega hetkel veel (ja ka praegu, 14 aastat hiljem) palju kehvemas seisus kui tollal elu probleemi korral.
“Some philosophers (Searle, 1984; Dennett, 1996) are rather fond of this analogy between “livingness” and “consciousness,” and so are we; but, as Chalmers (1995) has emphasized, an analogy is only an analogy. He has given philosophical reasons why he thinks it is wrong. Neuroscientists know only a few of the basics of neuroscience, such as the nature of the action potential and the chemical nature of most synapses. Most important, there is not a comprehensive, overall theory of the activities of the brain. To be shown to be correct, the analogy must be filled out by many experimental details and powerful general ideas. Much of these are still lacking.” (Crick & Koch, 1998)